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Abstract
We consider secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends
a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme
of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference
as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to
within a constant gap. The results are proved by first considering the deterministic interference channel model and
identifying a regime in which a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is optimal in terms of secure
sum capacity. For the symmetric case of the deterministic model, this simple scheme is optimal if and only if the
interference-to-signal ratio (in channel strengths) is no more than 2/3.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal work [1],
which studied a secure communication in the presence of a private key that is revealed to both transmitter
and legitimate receiver but not to the eavesdropper. Later, Wyner introduced the notion of secure capacity
via a degraded wiretap channel, in which a transmitter intends to send a confidential message to a legitimate
receiver by hiding it from a degraded eavesdropper [2]. The secure capacity is the maximum rate at which
the confidential message can be transmitted reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver. Wyner’s result
was subsequently generalized to the non-degraded wiretap channel by Csisza`r and Ko¨rner [3], and the
Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4]. This line of secure capacity research
has been extended to many multiuser channels, most notably, the broadcast channels [5]–[9], multiple
access channels [10]–[15], and the interference channels [5], [16]–[26].
In the line of secure capacity research, cooperative jamming has been proposed extensively to improve
the achievable secure rates in many channels (see [5], [10], [21], [22] and references therein). In particular,
cooperative jamming has been proposed in [21] and [22] to achieve the optimal secure sum degrees-of-
freedom (DoF) in the interference channel with confidential messages, wiretap channel with helpers,
multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast channel with confidential messages. The basic idea of
the cooperative jamming scheme is to send jamming signals to confuse the potential eavesdroppers, while
keeping legitimate receivers’ abilities to decode the desired messages. This might involve a cooperation
between the transmitters, and a careful design on the direction and/or power of the cooperative jamming
signals (see [5], [10], [21], [22]). It is therefore implicit that the cooperative jamming schemes might
incur some extra overhead, e.g., due to network coordination, channel state information (CSI) acquisition,
and power consumption.
In this work we study the secure communication schemes without cooperative jamming. In particular,
for a two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, we identify a regime in which the
simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter, without cooperative jamming, and
treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal
secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The secrecy offered by this GWC-TIN scheme is information-
theoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding method at any unintended receiver (eavesdropper). In this
simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the information of the channel phases. Therefore,
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2the overhead associated with acquiring channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) is minimal
for the GWC-TIN scheme.
The results are proved by first considering the deterministic interference channel model (see [27]) and
identifying a regime in which a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is optimal in terms of
secure sum capacity. In this simple scheme, the data is simply transmitted over the least significant signal
bits such that no interference is leaked to the unintended receiver. In this way, the deterministic interference
channel is decomposed into two parallel channels — in each channel the transmitter sends confidential
data to its legitimate receiver without the cooperation from the other transmitter. For the symmetric case
of the deterministic model, this simple scheme is optimal if and only if the interference-to-signal ratio
(in channel strengths) is no more than 2/3.
To prove the optimality of the aforementioned schemes, we derive a new secure capacity bound for
each of the two interference channel models. In our proof the approach is different from the genie-aided
approach that is commonly used in the settings without secrecy constraints (see [28]). In the genie-aided
approach, some genie-aided information is typically provided to the receivers, which might give a loose
bound in our setting.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, as well as
the simple scheme without cooperative jamming, for each of the Gaussian and deterministic interference
channels. Section III provides the main results of this work. The proofs are provided in Section IV,
Section V and the appendices. The work is concluded in Section VI. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•)
and h(•) denote the mutual information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. (•)T denotes the
transpose operation. Fq2 denotes a set of q-tuples of binary numbers. (•)+ = max{0, •}. Logarithms are
in base 2. Unless for some specific parameters, matrix, scalar, and vector are usually denoted by the italic
uppercase symbol (e.g., S), italic lowercase symbol (e.g., s), and the bold italic lowercase symbol (e.g.,
s), respectively. s ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes that the random variable s has a circularly symmetric complex
normal distribution with zero mean and σ2 variance.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the system models for Gaussian interference channel and deterministic interference
channel, respectively. For each model, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is also
discussed in this section.
A. Gaussian interference channel
We begin with a two-user Gaussian interference channel. The channel output at receiver k at time t is
yk(t) =
2∑
`=1
√
Pαk`ejθk`x`(t) + zk(t), k = 1, 2, (1)
t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where x`(t) is the channel input at transmitter ` subject to a normalized power constraint
E|x`(t)|2 ≤ 1, zk(t) ∼ CN (0, 1) is additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k,
√
Pαk` and θk` represent
the magnitude and phase of the channel between transmitter ` and receiver k, where P ≥ 1 is a nominal
power value1. The exponent αk` ≥ 0 represents the channel strength of the link between transmitter ` and
receiver k. We assume that each transmitter knows the channel strengths {αk`}k,` but not necessarily the
phases {θk`}k,`, while each receiver knows all the channel strengths and phases.
For this interference channel, each transmitter wishes to send a confidential message to its legitimate
receiver. Specifically transmitter k wishes to send to receiver k a message wk that is uniformly chosen
1In this work we assume that the channel phases, as well as the channel strengths, are fixed over the whole communication period.
However, our results can be extended easily to the settings where the channel phases are time-varying.
3from a set Wk,{1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, where Rk is the rate (bits/channel use) of this message and n is the
total number of channel uses, k = 1, 2. At transmitter k, a stochastic function
fk :Wk → X nk , k = 1, 2
is employed to encode the message. A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any  > 0
there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message reliably,
i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ,
Pr[wk 6= wˆk] ≤ , ∀k (2)
and the messages are kept secret such that
1
n
H(w1|yn2 ) ≥
1
n
H(w1)−  (3)
1
n
H(w2|yn1 ) ≥
1
n
H(w2)− , (4)
where ynk represents the n-length channel output of receiver k, k = 1, 2. The secure capacity region C is
the closure of the set of all achievable secure rate pairs. The secure sum capacity is defined as:
Csum, sup
{
R1 +R2| (R1, R2) ∈ C
}
. (5)
The secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF) is defined as
dsum, lim
P→∞
Csum
logP
. (6)
B. Deterministic interference channel
One way to better understand the capacity of the Gaussian channels is to study their linear deterministic
models (see [27]). In this work we also consider a two-user deterministic interference channel. By
following the common convention (see [25], [27]), we assume that the input-output relation of the
deterministic channel is given by
y1(t) = S
q−m11x1(t)⊕ Sq−m12x2(t) (7)
y2(t) = S
q−m21x1(t)⊕ Sq−m22x2(t), (8)
where xk(t) =
[
xk,1(t), xk,2(t), · · · , xk,q(t)
]T ∈ Fq2 denotes the channel input of transmitter k at time t;
yk(t) ∈ Fq2 denotes the channel output of receiver k at time t, k = 1, 2, q,max{m11,m12,m21,m22}; S
is a q × q lower shift matrix, and Sq−m21x1(t) =
[
0, · · · , 0, x1,1(t), · · · , x1,m21(t)
]T. ⊕ denotes modulo 2
addition. The nonnegative integers mkk and m`k denote the number of information bits that can be
communicated per channel use over the direct and cross links, respectively, for `, k ∈ {1, 2}, ` 6= k. For
the symmetric case of the deterministic channel model, we let
md = m11 = m22, mc = m12 = m21 (9)
and let
α, mc
md
(10)
that is a normalized interference parameter.
Similarly to the Gaussian case, transmitter k wishes to send to its receiver k a message wk that is
uniformly chosen from a set Wk = {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, k = 1, 2. Transmitter k uses a stochastic function
gk : Wk → Fq×n2 to encode the message. A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any
 > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message
reliably (cf. (2)) and the messages are kept secret, i.e., I(w1;yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2;yn1 ) ≤ n. The secure
capacity region C and sum capacity Csum are defined similarly as in the Gaussian case (cf. (5)).
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Fig. 1. The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the deterministic channel: the case with m11 = m22 = 3,m21 = 2, and m12 = 1.
In this case, transmitter 1 simply sends its private data over (m11 −m21)+ = 1 least significant bit of the signal, while transmitter 2 sends
its private data over (m22 −m12)+ = 2 least significant bits of the signal, without using cooperative jamming. The transmission of private
data is secure from the unintended receiver.
C. The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the deterministic channel model
Let us discuss a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (in short, WoCJ scheme) for the
deterministic channel defined in Section II-B. In this scheme, transmitter k simply sends a total of (mkk−
m`k)
+ bits of private data over the least significant signal bits without using cooperative jamming, for
k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= ` and (•)+ = max{0, •}. The transmission of the private data is secure from the
unintended receiver (eavesdropper) because the private data is not seen by the unintended receiver. In this
simple way the scheme achieves the following secure rate pair:
R1 = (m11 −m21)+ (11)
R2 = (m22 −m12)+. (12)
Fig. 1 depicts the scheme for a specific setting with m11 = m22 = 3,m21 = 2, and m12 = 1. Since the
data is transmitted over the least significant signal bits, it implies that: 1) no confidential information is
leaked to the unintended receiver; 2) no interference is leaked to the unintended receiver2. In this way,
the interference channel is decomposed into two parallel wiretap channels — in each wiretap channel
the transmitter sends confidential data to its legitimate receiver without the cooperation from the other
transmitter (see Fig. 1).
D. The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the Gaussian channel model
The scheme discussed in Section II-C can be extended to the Gaussian channel in a similar way. For this
Gaussian interference channel, each interference signal leaked to the unintended receiver is scaled down to
the noise level by applying a proper power allocation strategy. Due to the noisy interference, the Gaussian
interference channel is approximately decomposed into two parallel wiretap Gaussian channels. Therefore,
in this scheme each transmitter simply employs a Gaussian wiretap codebook (GWC) to guarantee the
secrecy without using cooperative jamming, while each receiver simply treats interference as noise (TIN)
when decoding its desired message. We call it as a GWC-TIN scheme. Note that the secrecy offered
by this GWC-TIN scheme is information-theoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding method at any
eavesdropper. Some details of the scheme are discussed as follows.
1) Gaussian wiretap codebook: To build the codebook, transmitter k generates a total of 2n(Rk+R′k)
independent codewords vnk with each element independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to
a circularly-symmetric complex normal distribution with variance P−βk , k = 1, 2, for some Rk, R′k and
2When the signal is not intended to the receiver, it usually interferes the desired signal and is typically called as interference. However, in
some communication scenarios with secrecy constraints, the interference signal could be utilized as a jamming signal to improve the secure
rate of the system. For notational convenience we will still use the name of “interference” to denote the unintended signal.
5βk ≥ 0 that will be designed specifically later on. The codebook Bk is defined as a set of the labeled
codewords:
Bk,
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : wk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, w′k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2. (13)
To transmit the message wk, transmitter k at first selects a bin (sub-codebook) Bk(wk) that is defined as
Bk(wk),
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : w
′
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2,
and then randomly chooses a codeword vnk from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution.
Since this scheme will not use cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword vnk will be mapped exactly
as a channel input sequence by transmitter k, that is, xk(t) = vk(t), t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where vk(t) is the
tth element of the codeword vnk , k = 1, 2. Based on this one-to-one mapping and Gaussian codebook, it
implies that
xk(t) = vk(t) ∼ CN (0, P−βk), ∀t, k = 1, 2. (14)
Then, the received signals take the following forms (removing the time index for simplicity):
y1 =
√
Pα11ejθ11v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pα11−β1
+
√
Pα12ejθ12v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pα12−β2
+ z1︸︷︷︸
P 0
(15)
y2 =
√
Pα22ejθ22v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pα22−β2
+
√
Pα21ejθ21v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pα21−β1
+ z2︸︷︷︸
P 0
(16)
(cf. (1)). In the above equations, the average power is noted under each summand term.
2) Treating interference as noise: In terms of decoding, each intended receiver simply treats interference
as noise. This implies that receiver k can decode the codeword vnk (wk, w
′
k) with arbitrarily small error
probability when n gets large and the rate of the codeword (i.e., Rk+R′k) satisfies the following condition:
Rk +R
′
k < I(vk; yk), k = 1, 2 (17)
(cf. [29]). Note that Rk and R′k represent the rates of the secure message wk and the confusion message
w′k, respectively (cf. (13)). Once the codeword v
n
k (wk, w
′
k) is decoded, the message wk can be decoded
directly from the codebook mapping. Let us set
Rk, I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`)−  (18)
R′k, I(vk; y`|v`)−  (19)
for some  > 0 and k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= `. Obviously, Rk and R′k designed in (18) and (19) satisfy the
condition in (17).
3) Secure rate: From the proof of [22, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies that, given the
above wiretap codebook and the rates designed in (18) and (19), the messages w1 and w2 are secure from
their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n. Therefore, by letting  → 0, the scheme
achieves the secure rate pair R1 = I(v1; y1) − I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2) − I(v2; y1|v1). Due to the
Gaussian inputs and outputs (see (14), (15) and (16)), this achievable secure rate pair is expressed as
R1 = log
(
1 +
Pα11−β1
1 + Pα12−β2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v1;y1)
− log(1 + Pα21−β1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v1;y2|v2)
R2 = log
(
1 +
Pα22−β2
1 + Pα21−β1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v2;y2)
− log(1 + Pα12−β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I(v2;y1|v1)
6for some β1, β2 ≥ 0. By setting β1 = α21 and β2 = α12, then the interference at each receiver is scaled
down to the noise level (see (15) and (16)) and the achievable secure rate pair becomes
R1 = log
(
1 +
Pα11−α21
2
)− 1 (20)
R2 = log
(
1 +
Pα22−α12
2
)− 1. (21)
Note that in this GWC-TIN scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the channel phases.
III. MAIN RESULTS
This section provides the main results for the deterministic channel model and Gaussian channel model,
respectively.
A. Results for the deterministic channel
For the deterministic channel defined in Section II-B, we identify a regime where a simple scheme
without using cooperative jamming (i.e., WoCJ scheme, described in Section II-C) achieves the optimal
secure sum capacity. The result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For the two-user deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, where mk` denotes
the level of bits of the channel from transmitter ` to receiver k, ∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, if the following conditions
are satisfied,
m22 + (m11 −m12)+ ≥ m21 +m12 (22)
m11 + (m22 −m21)+ ≥ m21 +m12 (23)
then a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (described in Section II-C) achieves the optimal
secure sum capacity, which is
Csum = (m22 −m12)+ + (m11 −m21)+. (24)
Proof. As discussed in Section II-C, WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of (m22−m12)++(m11−
m21)
+ without using cooperative jamming. To prove its optimality, we provide an outer bound on the
secure capacity region of the deterministic channel, given in Lemma 1 (see Section IV). The derived outer
bound reveals that the secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ scheme is indeed optimal if the conditions in
(22) and (23) are satisfied. In Remark 1 (see Section IV), we show how to prove Theorem 1 by using
the derived outer bound.
Example 1. To interpret the result in Theorem 1, we consider a setting with m11 = m22 = 3,m21 = 2
and m12 = 1. For this setting the conditions in (22) and (23) are satisfied. This implies from Theorem 1
that WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity without using cooperative jamming. For this
setting the optimal secure sum capacity is characterized as Csum = 3 bits/channel use.
For the symmetric case with md = m11 = m22, mc = m12 = m21, and α = mcmd (see (9) and (10)),
Theorem 1 reveals that if the following condition is satisfied,
0 ≤ α ≤ 2/3 (25)
then WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity, Csum = 2(md − mc), without using
cooperative jamming. More interestingly, for this symmetric case, condition (25) is indeed sufficient and
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Normalized sum capacity without secrecy constraint
Normalized secure sum capacity with secrecy constraint
Scheme without cooperative
jamming is optimal
Fig. 2. Normalized sum capacity vs. α for the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel with and without secrecy constraints,
where α = mc
md
. Note that a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if and only if
α ∈ [0, 2
3
].
necessary for WoCJ scheme to be optimal in terms of secure sum capacity3. A more general result on
the symmetric case is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, the
normalized secure sum capacity Csum
md
is characterized as
Csum
md
=

2(1− α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
(26a)
2(2α− 1) for 2
3
≤ α ≤ 3
4
(26b)
2(1− 2α
3
) for 3
4
≤ α < 1 (26c)
0 for α = 1 (26d)
2α
3
for 1 < α ≤ 3
2
(26e)
2(2− α) for 3
2
≤ α ≤ 2 (26f)
0 for 2 ≤ α . (26g)
Moreover, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming, that is, WoCJ scheme, achieves the optimal
secure sum capacity if and only if α ∈ [0, 2
3
].
Proof. The converse is relegated to Section IV (see Lemma 1 and Remark 2 in Section IV). For the
achievability, note that WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of 2(md − mc) for this symmetric
setting, again, without using cooperative jamming. The secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ scheme is
optimal when α ∈ [0, 2
3
] — the optimality is proved through the derived converse. For the other regimes
with strictly positive secure sum capacity, i.e., α ∈ (2
3
, 1)∪ (1, 2), the secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ
scheme is not optimal. When α ∈ (2
3
, 1)∪ (1, 2), the schemes with cooperative jamming have been shown
in [25] to achieve the optimal secure sum capacity of this symmetric setting (see Appendix C for the
sketch of the schemes).
Fig. 2 depicts the normalized secure sum capacity with secrecy constraint (cf. Theorem 2), as well as the
normalized sum capacity without secrecy constraint (cf. [28]), for the two-user symmetric deterministic
interference channel. Note that WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if and only if
α ∈ [0, 2
3
]. Also note that secrecy constraint incurs no capacity penalty if and only if α ∈ [0, 1
2
].
3When we determine whether a condition is necessary for a scheme to be optimal, we just focus on the regime where the secure sum
capacity is strictly positive.
8B. Results for the Gaussian channel
Let us now focus on the Gaussian channel defined in Section II-A. For this Gaussian channel, we
identify a regime where the simple scheme without cooperative jamming, that is, GWC-TIN scheme
described in Section II-D, achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The result
is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, where αk` denotes
the channel strength from transmitter ` to receiver k, ∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, if the following the conditions are
satisfied,
α22 + (α11 − α12)+ ≥ α21 + α12 (27)
α11 + (α22 − α21)+ ≥ α21 + α12 (28)
then the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without using cooperative
jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (that is, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves
the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Moreover, given the conditions of (27) and
(28), the optimal secure sum capacity Csum satisfies
log
(
1 +
Pα11−α21
2
)
+ log
(
1 +
Pα22−α12
2
)− 2 ≤ Csum ≤ log(1 + 2Pα22−α12) + log(1 + 2Pα11−α21) + 4,
(29)
where the lower bound is achieved by GWC-TIN scheme.
Proof. As discussed in Section II-D, GWC-TIN scheme achieves a secure sum rate of R1+R2 = log
(
1+
Pα11−α21
2
)
+ log
(
1 + P
α22−α12
2
) − 2 (see (20) and (21)). To prove the optimality of GWC-TIN scheme,
we provide an upper bound on the secure sum capacity of the Gaussian channel, given in Lemma 3 (see
Section V). The derived upper bound reveals that, if the conditions in (27) and (28) are satisfied, then the
achievable secure sum rate of GWC-TIN scheme indeed approaches the secure sum capacity to within a
constant gap. In Remark 3 (see Section V), we show how to prove Theorem 3 by using the derived upper
bound.
Example 2. To interpret the result in Theorem 3, we consider a setting with α11 = 2, α22 = 3, α21 = 1
and α12 = 2. For this setting the conditions in (27) and (28) are satisfied. This implies from Theorem 3
that GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap, without using
cooperative jamming.
In (29), a secure sum capacity is characterized to within a constant gap. This directly implies the
characterization of the secure sum GDoF. The following GDoF result is concluded from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1 (GDoF result). For the two-user Gaussian interference channel, if the conditions of (27) and
(28) are satisfied, then GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum GDoF, which is
d?sum = (α22 − α12)+ + (α11 − α21)+. (30)
For the symmetric case with α11 = α22 and α12 = α21, Theorem 3 directly implies that if the following
condition is satisfied,
0 ≤ α12
α11
≤ 2
3
(31)
then GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The result on
the symmetric case is stated in the following corollary.
9Corollary 2 (Symmetric Gaussian channel). For the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel
with α11 = α22 and α12 = α21, if the condition of 0 ≤ α12α11 ≤ 23 is satisfied, then GWC-TIN scheme
achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Under this condition, the optimal
secure sum capacity Csum satisfies
2 log
(
1 +
Pα11−α21
2
)− 2 ≤ Csum ≤ 2 log(1 + 2Pα11−α21)+ 4,
while the optimal secure sum GDoF is characterized by
d?sum = 2(α11 − α21).
IV. CONVERSE FOR THE DETERMINISTIC CHANNEL
For the deterministic channel defined in Section II-B, we provide a general outer bound on the secure
capacity region, which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For the two-user deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, an outer bound of
secure capacity region is given by
R1 ≤ max{0, m11 − (m21 −m22)+} (32)
R2 ≤ max{0, m22 − (m12 −m11)+} (33)
R1 +R2 ≤ max{m21 − (m11 −m12)+, m22 −m12, 0}
+max{m12 − (m22 −m21)+, m11 −m21, 0} (34)
2R1 +R2 ≤ max{m11,m12}+ (m11 −m21)+ + (m22 −m12)+ (35)
2R2 +R1 ≤ max{m22,m21}+ (m11 −m21)+ + (m22 −m12)+. (36)
Before describing the proof of Lemma 1, we at first show how to prove Theorems 1 and 2 by using
the result of Lemma 1.
Remark 1 (Converse proof of Theorem 1). The converse of Theorem 1 follows from bound (34). Let us
consider the two conditions in (22) and (23), i.e., m22 + (m11 −m12)+ ≥ m21 +m12 and m11 + (m22 −
m21)
+ ≥ m21 +m12. If these two conditions are satisfied, then bound (34) can be rewritten as
R1 +R2 ≤ (m22 −m12)+ + (m11 −m21)+. (37)
On the other hand, WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of R1+R2 = (m22−m12)++(m11−m21)+
(see (11) and (12)), which matches the upper bound derived in (37). Therefore, WoCJ scheme achieves
the optimal secure sum capacity if the conditions in (22) and (23) are satisfied.
Remark 2 (Converse proof of Theorem 2). Note that Theorem 2 is limited to the symmetric case with
md = m11 = m22 and mc = m12 = m21. The converse of (26a) and (26b) in Theorem 2 follows from
bound (34). The converse of (26c) - (26g) in Theorem 2 has been proved in [24] that considered the
two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel with transmitter cooperation. The result of [24]
has been extended in this work to the general setting of the deterministic interference channel, stated in
(32), (33), (35) and (36).
As mentioned in Remarks 1 and 2, bound (34) in Lemma 1 proves the optimality of the schemes
without cooperative jamming in the declared regimes (see Theorems 1 and 2). In what follows we will
provide the proof of (34), while the proofs of (32), (33), (35) and (36) are relegated to Appendix B.
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m12 bits
(m11 −m12)+ bits
m12 bits
(a): when m11 > m12 (b) when m11 ≤ m12
s11 is interference-free at receiver 1x1
x2
y1
x1
x2
y1
s12
s12
s11 = φ
Fig. 3. Deterministic channel model for receiver 1. s11 represents the top (m11 −m12)+ bits of x1, i.e., the interference-free bits sent
from transmitter 1 to receiver 1. s12 represents the top m12 bits of x2, i.e., the signal bits sent from transmitter 2 to receiver 1.
A. Proof of bound (34)
For the proof of bound (34), our approach is different from the genie-aided approach that is commonly
used in the settings without secrecy constraints (cf. [28]). In the genie-aided approach, some genie-aided
information is typically provided to the receivers, which might give a loose bound in our setting.
At first, let
xk,1:τ (t),[xk,1(t), xk,2(t), · · · , xk,τ (t)]T
that represents the top (most significant) τ bits of xk(t), and let xnk,1:τ ,{xk,1:τ (t)}nt=1, for some positive
τ and k = 1, 2. We also define that
s11(t),x1,1:(m11−m12)+(t) (38)
s12(t),x2,1:m12(t). (39)
In our context, s11(t) represents the top (m11 −m12)+ bits of x1(t), while s12(t) represents the top m12
bits of x2(t) (see Fig. 3). We begin with the rate of user 1:
nR1 = H(w1)
= I(w1;yn1 ) +H(w1|yn1 )
≤ I(w1;yn1 ) + n1,n (40)
≤ I(w1;yn1 )− I(w1;yn2 ) + n1,n + n (41)
where (40) follows from Fano’s inequality, limn→∞ 1,n = 0; (41) results from secrecy constraint in (3),
i.e., I(w1;yn2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small . Similarly, for the rate of user 2 we have
nR2 ≤ I(w2;yn2 )− I(w2;yn1 ) + n2,n + n (42)
which, together with (41), gives the following bound on the sum rate:
nR1 + nR2 − n1,n − n2,n − 2n
≤ I(w1;yn1 )− I(w1;yn2 ) + I(w2;yn2 )− I(w2;yn1 )
= H(yn1 )−H(yn1 |w1)−H(yn2 ) +H(yn2 |w1)
+H(yn2 )−H(yn2 |w2)−H(yn1 ) +H(yn1 |w2)
= H(yn2 |w1)−H(yn1 |w1) +H(yn1 |w2)−H(yn2 |w2). (43)
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For the first two terms in the right-hand side of (43), we have:
H(yn2 |w1)−H(yn1 |w1)
= H(sn11,yn2 |w1)−H(sn11|yn2 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J1
−H(sn11,yn1 |w1) +H(sn11|yn1 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J2
(44)
= H(sn11|w1) +H(yn2 |sn11, w1)−H(sn11|w1)−H(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
= H(yn2 |sn11, w1)−H(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
= H(sn12,yn2 |sn11, w1)−H(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J3
−H(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 (45)
= H(sn12|sn11, w1) +H(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J4
−H(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 (46)
= H(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)−H(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (47)
= −I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (48)
where J1,H(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2,H(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3,H(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1) and J4,H(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1); the
steps from (44) to (46) follow from chain rule; (47) follows from that
H(sn12|sn11, w1) =H(sn12) (49)
=H(sn12|xn1 , sn11, w1) (50)
=H
({
Sq−m12x2(t)
}n
t=1
|xn1 , sn11, w1
)
=H
({
Sq−m11x1(t)⊕ Sq−m12x2(t)
}n
t=1
|xn1 , sn11, w1
)
(51)
=H(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)
where (49) and (50) use the fact that sn12 is independent of s
n
11, w1 and x
n
1 ; (51) follows from the fact
that H(a|b) = H(a⊕ b|b) for any random a, b ∈ Fq2. Going back to (48), we further have
H(yn2 |w1)−H(yn1 |w1) = −I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (52)
≤ J2 + J4 (53)
≤ n ·max{m21 − (m11 −m12)+,m22 −m12, 0} (54)
where (52) is from (48); (53) follows from the fact that mutual information and entropy are always
nonnegative; (54) follows from Lemma 2 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and
user 2, we also have
H(yn1 |w2)−H(yn2 |w2) ≤ n ·max{m12 − (m22 −m21)+, m11 −m21, 0}. (55)
Finally, combining (43), (54) and (55) gives the following bound on the sum rate
R1 +R2 ≤max{m21 − (m11 −m12)+, m22 −m12, 0}
+max{m12 − (m22 −m21)+, m11 −m21, 0}+ 1,n+2,n+2.
Letting n→∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (34). The lemma used in our
proof is provided below.
Lemma 2. For J2 = H(sn11|yn1 , w1) and J4 = H(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1), we have
J2 ≤ 0 (56)
J4 ≤ n ·max{m21 − (m11 −m12)+, m22 −m12, 0}. (57)
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s11: (m11 −m12)+ bits
x1
x2
s12
y2
m12 bits
(m21 − (m11 −m12)+)+ bits
(m22 −m12)+ bits
Fig. 4. Deterministic channel model for receiver 2. The solid pipe lines are associated with the bits that can be reconstructed from either
s11 or s12, while the dash pipe lines are associated with the bits that can not be reconstructed from {s11, s12}. Therefore, s11 and s12 can
reconstruct all the bits except max{(m21−(m11−m12)+)+, (m22−m12)+} least significant bits of y2. For example, when m11 = m22 = 3
and m12 = m21 = 2, then s11 and s12 can reconstruct all the bits except one least significant bit of y2.
Proof. Begin with J2, we have:
J2 = H(sn11|yn1 , w1)
=
n∑
t=1
H(s11(t)|st−111 ,yn1 , w1) (58)
≤
n∑
t=1
H(s11(t)|y1(t)) (59)
= 0 (60)
where (58) results from chain rule; (59) uses the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (60) follows from
the fact that s11(t) can be reconstructed from y1(t) (see Fig. 3).
Now we focus on the upper bound of J4:
J4 = H(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1)
=
n∑
t=1
H(y2(t)|yt−12 , sn12, sn11, w1) (61)
≤
n∑
t=1
H(y2(t)|s12(t), s11(t)) (62)
≤ n ·max{m21 − (m11 −m12)+, m22 −m12, 0} (63)
where (61) results from chain rule; (62) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (63)
holds true because, s12(t) and s11(t) allow for the reconstruction of all the bits except max{m21− (m11−
m12)
+, m22 − m12, 0} least significant bits of y2(t). As shown in Fig. 4, s11(t) represents the top
(m11 −m12)+ bits of x1(t), which indicates that s11(t) can reconstruct the top (m11 −m12)+ bits of the
cross-link signal sent from transmitter 1 to receiver 2. The (m21− (m11−m12)+)+ least significant bits of
cross-link signal sent from transmitter 1 to receiver 2 could not be recovered from s11(t). Similarly, s12(t)
can reconstruct the top m12 bits, but not the (m22 −m12)+ least significant bits, of the direct-link signal
sent from transmitter 2 to receiver 2. Therefore, s12(t) and s11(t) can reconstruct partial bits of y2(t),
leaving max{(m21−(m11−m12)+)+, (m22−m12)+} least significant bits of y2(t) unreconstructable.
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V. CONVERSE FOR THE GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
For the Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, we provide an upper bound on the secure
sum capacity, which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, the secure sum capacity
is upper bounded by
Csum ≤ log(1 + Pα22−α12 + Pα22−(α11−α12)+) + log(1 + Pα11−α21 + Pα11−(α22−α21)+) + 4. (64)
Remark 3 (Converse proof of Theorem 3). The converse of Theorem 3 follows from the upper bound
in (64). Let us consider the two conditions in (27) and (28), i.e., α22 + (α11 − α12)+ ≥ α21 + α12 and
α11+(α22−α21)+ ≥ α21+α12. If these two conditions are satisfied, then we can further bound the secure
sum capacity by
Csum ≤ log(1 + 2Pα22−α12) + log(1 + 2Pα11−α21) + 4 (65)
where (65) results from bound (64), as well as the facts that Pα22−α12 ≥ Pα22−(α11−α12)+ and that
Pα11−α21 ≥ Pα11−(α22−α21)+ under the two conditions in (27) and (28). On the other hand, GWC-TIN
scheme described in Section II-D achieves a secure sum rate of
R1 +R2 = log
(
1 +
Pα11−α21
2
)
+ log
(
1 +
Pα22−α12
2
)− 2 (66)
(see (20) and (21)). One can easily check that the gap between the secure sum capacity lower bound
in (66) and upper bound in (65) is no more than 10 bits/channel use. Note that, the gap can be further
reduced by optimizing the computations in converse and achievability.
Let us now prove Lemma 3. The proof follows closely from that derived for the deterministic case
(see Section IV-A). At first we define that
s11(t),
√
P (α11−α12)+ejθ11x1(t) + z˜1(t) (67)
s12(t),
√
Pα12ejθ12x2(t) + z1(t), (68)
where z˜1(t) ∼ CN (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent of the other noise and transmitted signals.
By following the steps of (40) - (43) derived in Section IV-A, we can bound the sum rate of this Gaussian
channel as
nR1 + nR2 − n1,n − n2,n − 2n ≤ h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1) + h(yn1 |w2)− h(yn2 |w2). (69)
Then, following the steps of (44) - (48) gives:
h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1)
= h(sn11, y
n
2 |w1)− h(sn11|yn2 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J1
−h(sn11, yn1 |w1) + h(sn11|yn1 , w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J2
(70)
= h(yn2 |sn11, w1)− h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
= h(sn12, y
n
2 |sn11, w1)− h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J3
−h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2
= h(sn12|sn11, w1) + h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, J4
−h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 (71)
= h(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)− h(yn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (72)
= −I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (73)
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where J1, h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2, h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3, h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1) and J4, h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1); the steps
from (70) to (71) follow from chain rule; (72) stems from that
h(sn12|sn11, w1) =h(sn12) (74)
=h(sn12|xn1 , sn11, w1) (75)
=h({
√
Pα12ejθ12x2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , sn11, w1)
=h({
√
Pα11ejθ11x1(t) +
√
Pα12ejθ12x2(t) + z1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , sn11, w1) (76)
=h(yn1 |xn1 , sn11, w1)
where (74) and (75) use the fact that sn12 is independent of s
n
11, w1 and x
n
1 ; (76) follows from that h(a|b) =
h(a+ b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b. Going back to (73), we further have
h(yn2 |w1)− h(yn1 |w1) = −I(yn1 ;xn1 |sn11, w1)− J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (77)
≤ −J1 + J2 − J3 + J4 (78)
≤ n log(1 + Pα22−α12 + Pα21−(α11−α12)+) + n log 4 (79)
where (77) is from (73); (78) stems from the nonnegativity of mutual information; (79) follows from
Lemma 4 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have
h(yn1 |w2)− h(yn2 |w2) ≤ n log(1 + Pα11−α21 + Pα12−(α22−α21)
+
) + n log 4. (80)
Finally, combining (69), (79) and (80) gives the following bound on the sum rate
R1 +R2 ≤ log(1 + Pα22−α12 + Pα22−(α11−α12)+) + 2
+ log(1 + Pα11−α21 + Pα11−(α22−α21)
+
) + 2 + 1,n + 2,n + 2. (81)
By setting n → ∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and  → 0, we get the desired bound (64). The lemma used in
our proof is provided below.
Lemma 4. For J1 = h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2 = h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3 = h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1) and J4 = h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1),
we have
J1 ≥ n log(pie) (82)
J3 ≥ n log(pie) (83)
J2 ≤ n log(4pie) (84)
J4 ≤ n log(pie(1 + Pα22−α12 + Pα21−(α11−α12)+)). (85)
Proof. See Appendix A.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This work showed that a simple scheme without cooperative jamming (i.e., GWC-TIN scheme) can
indeed achieve the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap in a regime (see (27) and (28)) of
the two-user Gaussian interference channel. In this GWC-TIN scheme, each transmitter uses a Gaussian
wiretap codebook, while each receiver treats interference as noise when decoding the desired message.
In this simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the information of the channel phases. For
the deterministic interference channel model, this work identified a regime (see (22) and (23)) in which a
simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (i.e., WoCJ scheme) is optimal in terms of secure sum
capacity. For the symmetric case of the deterministic model, the identified regime (i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 2/3) is
indeed a sufficient and necessary regime for WoCJ scheme to be optimal. In the future work, it would
be interesting to determine whether the conditions in (22) and (23) are also necessary for WoCJ scheme
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to be optimal, for the general deterministic interference channel. For the general Gaussian interference
channel, again, it would be interesting to determine whether the conditions (27) and (28) are also necessary
for GWC-TIN scheme to be optimal in terms of secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Another
direction of the future work is to study on the optimality of the secure communication without using
cooperative jamming in some other channels, such as k-user interference channel and wiretap channel
with helper.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Remind that J1 = h(sn11|yn2 , w1), J2 = h(sn11|yn1 , w1), J3 = h(sn12|yn2 , sn11, w1), J4 = h(yn2 |sn12, sn11, w1),
s11(t) =
√
P (α11−α12)+ejθ11x1(t) + z˜1(t), and s12(t) =
√
Pα12ejθ12x2(t) + z1(t). At first we focus on the
lower bound of J1:
J1 = h(s
n
11|yn2 , w1)
≥ h(sn11|xn1 , yn2 , w1) (86)
= h({
√
P (α11−α12)+ejθ11x1(t) + z˜1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , yn2 , w1)
= h({z˜1(t)}nt=1|xn1 , yn2 , w1) (87)
= h({z˜1(t)}nt=1)
= n log(pie)
where (86) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (87) follows from the fact
that h(a|b) = h(a− b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b; the last equality holds true because
h(z˜1(t)) = log(pie). Similarly, we have
J3 = h(s
n
12|yn2 , sn11, w1)
≥ h(sn12|xn2 , yn2 , sn11, w1)
= h({z1(t)}nt=1)
= n log(pie).
Now we focus on the upper bound of J2:
J2 = h(s
n
11|yn1 , w1)
=
n∑
t=1
h(s11(t)|st−111 , yn1 , w1) (88)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(s11(t)|y1(t)) (89)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
s11(t)−
√
P−α12y1(t)|y1(t)
)
(90)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜1(t) + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)ejθ11x1(t)− ejθ12x2(t)−
√
P−α12z1(t)
∣∣y1(t))
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z˜1(t) + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)ejθ11x1(t)− ejθ12x2(t)−
√
P−α12z1(t)
)
(91)
≤ n log(pie(2 + (
√
P (α11−α12)+ −
√
Pα11−α12)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
+P−α12︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
)) (92)
≤ n log(4pie) (93)
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where (88) results from chain rule; (89) and (91) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential
entropy; (90) uses the fact that h(a|b) = h(a − βb|b) for a constant β; (92) follows from the fact that
h
(
z˜1(t) + β0e
jθ11x1(t)− β1ejθ12x2(t)− β2z1(t)
) ≤ log(pie(1+ β20 + β21 + β22)) for constants β0, β1 and β2;
(93) uses the identities that 0 ≤
√
P (α11−α12)+ −√Pα11−α12 ≤ 1 and that P−α12 ≤ 1. Remind that P ≥ 1,
αk` ≥ 0,∀k, ` ∈ {1, 2}, and (•)+ = max{0, •}.
Similarly, we have the following upper bound on J4:
J4 = h(y
n
2 |sn12, sn11, w1)
=
n∑
t=1
h(y2(t)|yt−12 , sn12, sn11, w1) (94)
≤
n∑
t=1
h(y2(t)|s12(t), s11(t)) (95)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
y2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12ej(θ22−θ12)s12(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+ej(θ21−θ11)s11(t)|s12(t), s11(t)
)
(96)
=
n∑
t=1
h
(
z2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12ej(θ22−θ12)z1(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+ej(θ21−θ11)z˜1(t)
∣∣s12(t), s11(t))
≤
n∑
t=1
h
(
z2(t)−
√
Pα22−α12ej(θ22−θ12)z1(t)−
√
Pα21−(α11−α12)+ej(θ21−θ11)z˜1(t)
)
(97)
≤ n log(pie(1 + Pα22−α12 + Pα21−(α11−α12)+))
where (94) results from chain rule; (95) and (97) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential
entropy; (96) uses the fact that h(a|b, c) = h(a−β1b−β2c|b, c) for constants β1 and β2; the last inequality
stems from the fact that h
(
z2(t) − β3ej(θ22−θ12)z1(t) − β4ej(θ21−θ11)z˜1(t)
) ≤ log(pie(1 + β23 + β24)) for
constants β3 and β4. At this point we complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (32), (33), (35) AND (36) IN LEMMA 1
A. Proof of bounds (32) and (33)
Let us at first prove bound (32). Note that bound (33) can be proved in a similar way. Beginning with
Fano’s inequality, we can bound the rate of receiver 1 as:
nR1 ≤ I(w1;yn1 ) + n1,n
≤ I(w1;xn1,1:m11) + n1,n (98)
≤ I(w1;xn1,1:m11 ,xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+ ,yn2 ) + n1,n (99)
≤ I(w1;xn1,1:m11 ,xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+ ,yn2 )− I(w1;yn2 ) + n+ n1,n (100)
= I(w1;xn1,1:m11 ,x
n
2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+ |yn2 ) + n+ n1,n
= I(w1;xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+|yn2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n·(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+
+ I(w1;xn1,1:m11|yn2 ,xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n·(m11−min{m11,m21})
+ n+ n1,n
≤ n · (min{m11,m21} − (m21 −m22)+)+ + n · (m11 −min{m11,m21}) + n+ n1,n (101)
= n · (m11 −min{m11,m21, (m21 −m22)+}) + n+ n1,n (102)
= n ·max{0, m11 − (m21 −m22)+}+ n+ n1,n
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x2 y2
(m21 −m22)+ bits
x1
x1,1:min{m11,m21}
(min{m11,m21} − (m21 −m22)+)+
x2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+
bits
Fig. 5. Deterministic channel model for receiver 2. x1,1:min{m11,m21} can be reconstructed from {y2,x2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+}.
For example, when m11 = m22 = 3 and m12 = m21 = 5, then x1,1:3 can be reconstructed from {y2,x2,1:1}.
where limn→∞ 1,n = 0; (98) stems from the Markov chain of w1 → xn1,1:m11 → yn1 ; (99) results
from the fact that adding information does not decrease the mutual information; (100) results from the
secrecy constraint, i.e., I(w1;yn2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small  (cf. (3)); (101) follows from the fact
that I(w1;xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+ |yn2 ) ≤ n · (min{m11,m21} − (m21 −m22)+)+, and the fact that
xn1,1:min{m11,m21} can be reconstructed from {yn2 ,xn2,1:(min{m11,m21}−(m21−m22)+)+} (see Fig. 5); (102) follows
from the identity that (a1−a2)++a3−a1 = a3−min{a1, a2} for any real numbers a1, a2 and a3. Letting
n→∞, 1,n → 0 and → 0, it gives bound (32). By interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, bound
(33) can be proved in a similar way.
B. Proof of bounds (35) and (36)
In what follows we will prove bound (35). Bound (36) can be proved in a similar way. Beginning with
Fano’s inequality, we can bound the rate of receiver 1 as:
nR1 − n1,n
≤ I(w1;yn1 )
≤ I(w1;yn1 )− I(w1;yn2 ) + n (103)
≤ I(w1;yn1 ,xn1,1:max{m11,m21},xn2,1:max{m12,m22},yn2 )− I(w1;yn2 ) + n (104)
= I(w1;yn1 ,xn1,1:max{m11,m21},x
n
2,1:max{m12,m22}|yn2 ) + n
= I(w1;xn1,1:max{m11,m21},x
n
2,1:max{m12,m22}|yn2 ) + I(w1;yn1 |xn1,1:max{m11,m21},xn2,1:max{m12,m22},yn2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+n
= I(w1;xn1,1:max{m11,m21},x
n
2,1:max{m12,m22}|yn2 ) + n (105)
≤ H(xn1,1:max{m11,m21},xn2,1:max{m12,m22}|yn2 ) + n (106)
= H(xn1,1:max{m11,m21},x
n
2,1:max{m12,m22},y
n
2 )−H(yn2 ) + n
= H(xn1,1:max{m11,m21},x
n
2,1:max{m12,m22})−H(yn2 ) + n (107)
where (103) results from a secrecy constraint (cf. (3)); (104) stems from the fact that adding information
does not decrease the mutual information; (106) follows from the nonnegativity of entropy; (105) and
(107) follow from the Markov chain of {w1, w2} → {xn1,1:max{m11,m21},xn2,1:max{m12,m22}} → {yn1 ,yn2}. On
the other hand, we have
nR1 ≤ I(w1;yn1 ) + n1,n (108)
≤ I(xn1 ;yn1 ) + n1,n (109)
= H(yn1 )−H(yn1 |xn1 ) + n1,n
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Fig. 6. Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with md = 4 and mc = 3. At each time, each transmitter sends md−mc = 1
bit of private data and 3mc − 2md = 1 bit of common data. The transmission of private data (a2 for transmitter 1 and b2 for transmitter 2)
is secure from the unintended receiver. The transmission of common data (a1 for transmitter 1 and b1 for transmitter 2) is also secure by
using cooperative jamming signal (u1 for transmitter 1 and v1 for transmitter 2).
= H(yn1 )−H(xn2,1:m12|xn1 ) + n1,n (110)
= H(yn1 )−H(xn2,1:m12) + n1,n (111)
where (108) results from Fano’s inequality; (109) follows from the Markov chain of w1 → xn1 → yn1 ;
(110) results from the definition of y1(t) = Sq−m11x1(t)⊕ Sq−m12x2(t) (cf. (7)); (111) follows from the
independence between xn1 and x
n
2 . In a similar way, we have
nR2 ≤ H(yn2 )−H(xn1,1:m21) + n2,n. (112)
Finally, by combing (107), (111) and (112), it gives
2nR1 + nR2 − 2n1,n − n2,n − n
≤ H(yn1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n·max{m11,m12}
+H(xn1,1:max{m11,m21})−H(xn1,1:m21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n·(m11−m21)+
+H(xn2,1:max{m12,m22})−H(xn2,1:m12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n·(m22−m12)+
≤ n ·max{m11,m12}+ n · (m11 −m21)+ + n · (m22 −m12)+ (113)
where (113) follows from the facts that H(yn1 ) ≤ n · max{m11,m12}, that H(xn1,1:max{m11,m21}) −
H(xn1,1:m21) ≤ n·(max{m11,m21}−m21) = n·(m11−m21)+, and that H(xn2,1:max{m12,m22})−H(xn2,1:m12) ≤
n · (m22 −m12)+. By setting n → ∞, 1,n, 2,n → 0 and  → 0, it gives bound (35). By interchanging
the roles of user 1 and user 2, bound (36) can be proved in a similar way.
APPENDIX C
A SKETCH OF THE COOPERATIVE JAMMING SCHEMES FOR THEOREM 2
For the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel, the work in [25] has proposed some
schemes with cooperative jamming that are optimal when 2
3
< α < 1 and 1 < α < 2, in terms of secure
sum secure capacity. This section just provides a sketch of these cooperative jamming schemes, as more
details could be found in [25]. In these cooperative jamming schemes, each transmitter generally sends
one or more of the following signals: 1) private data signal, which can only be seen by its desired receiver;
2) common data signal, which can be received by both receivers; 3) jamming signal, which can be used
to jam the unintended common data signal to guarantee secrecy.
For the case of 2
3
< α ≤ 3
4
, at each time each transmitter sends a total of 2mc−md bits of data, consisting
of md −mc bits of private data and 3mc − 2md bits of common data. In this case, the transmission of
both private data and common data is secure from the corresponding eavesdropper by using cooperative
jamming (see Fig. 6 on the setting with md = 4 and mc = 3).
For the case of 3
4
< α ≤ 1, at each time each transmitter sends a total of md − 23mc bits of data,
consisting of md − mc bits of private data and mc3 bits of common data. For simplicity of exposition,
we focus on the setting with md = 7 and mc = 6, and depict the optimal scheme in Fig. 7. As can be
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Fig. 7. Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with md = 7 and mc = 6. At each time, each transmitter sends a total
of md − 23mc = 3 bits of data, consisting of md −mc = 1 bit of private data and mc3 = 2 bits of common data. The transmission of
private data (a3 for transmitter 1 and b3 for transmitter 2) is secure from the unintended receiver. The transmission of common data (a1, a2
for transmitter 1 and b1, b2 for transmitter 2) is also secure by using cooperative jamming signal (u1, u2 for transmitter 1 and v1, v2 for
transmitter 2).
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Fig. 8. Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with md = 5 and mc = 6. At each time, each transmitter sends a total
of mc
3
bits of common data. The transmission of common data (a1, a2 for transmitter 1 and b1, b2 for transmitter 2) is secure by utilizing
cooperative jamming.
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Fig. 9. Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with md = 2 and mc = 3. At each time, each transmitter sends a total of
2md −mc = 1 bit of common data that is secure from the corresponding eavesdropper by utilizing cooperative jamming.
seen in Fig. 7, the transmission of both private data and common data is secure from the corresponding
eavesdropper.
For the case of 1 < α < 3
2
, each transmitter sends a total of mc
3
bits of common data per channel time.
The optimal scheme is depicted in Fig. 8 on the setting with md = 5 and mc = 6.
For the case of 3
2
≤ α < 2, each transmitter sends a total of 2md−mc bits of common data per channel
time. The optimal scheme is depicted in Fig. 9 on the setting with md = 2 and mc = 3.
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